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ON COPYRIGHT AND SCIENTIFIC THEORY
Thomas M. Byron†
At present, intellectual property law offers extremely limited
possibilities for protecting a scientific theory in its most basic form,
including fundamental hypotheses, rule-based relations, mathematical
equations, models, and diagrams. Regardless of the current state of
intellectual property law, this Article is willing to entertain a
hypothesis of its own—that scientific theory could be a proper subject
of copyright protection. In two discussion sections, the Article defends
both sides of the debate. One side of the debate argues in favor of
copyright protection for scientific theories, showing that scientific
theory represents an intellectual creation of the scientist, not a mere
statement of uncopyrightable fact. A scientific theory offers substantial
flexibility and openness in its creation due to the presence of nearinfinite theories that could have been chosen instead of any given
theoretical equivalent. If a scientific theory satisfies the current
requirements for copyrightability, then there is no reason not to grant
it protection. The other side of the debate advocates the opposite
point—that copyright should not protect scientific theory—and bases
this argument on science’s ever-progressing nature and its community
standards that favor free access to the work of other scientists. That
side also opposes the presence of sufficient legal creativity to merit
copyright protection of a scientific theory. To structure the arguments
presented in the two primary sections, this Article relies heavily on the
philosophy of the early-twentieth-century physicist and scientific
historian Pierre Duhem. After an investigation of both the strengths
and limitations of Duhem’s theories, the Article concludes by weighing
the merits of the two arguments proposed.

† Ph.D., Boston University, French Language and Literature; J.D., Emory University; and A.B.,
Dartmouth College. All errors are the author’s.
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INTRODUCTION
It is close to black letter law that scientific theory1—at least in its
sparest form of models, basic hypotheses, and equations—is not
eligible for any meaningful intellectual property protection. The point
can be made in a brief regime-by-regime review of intellectual
property’s current domains of protection. Let us begin with patents:
Patent law makes a general distinction between unapplied and
applied science, wherein only the latter receives protection. It was in
this vein that the Supreme Court interpreted the Patent Act in Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, noting that:
[t]he laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas
have been held not patentable. Thus, a new mineral
discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not
patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent
his celebrated law that E = mc2; nor could Newton have
patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are
‘manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.’2
If scientific laws and the equations and models simulating them are not
patentable, this is because patent law’s protections require more than
scientific theory’s observation and modeling of reality as it
(purportedly) is. The Court in Diamond went on to hold that the
microorganism at issue in the case was patentable because, unlike the
1. For purposes of this Article, scientific theory may be defined as a series of hypotheses,
rule-based relations, mathematical equations, diagrams, and models that are capable of being
tested and intended to serve a predictive function with respect to empirical reality. The theories
discussed here may be comprised of numeric, symbolic, or linguistic components, but any nonnumeric, non-symbolic aspects of the theory are assumed to be expressed as briefly and
economically as possible—in other words, we are concerned here with the potential of providing
intellectual property protection for the statement, “For every action, there is an equal and opposite
reaction,” as opposed to the question of whether Newton’s Principia would be copyrightable as a
whole (if written today). ISAAC NEWTON, PRINCIPIA, at 86 (Daniel Adee ed., Andrew Motte trans.,
1846) (1687).
2. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citations omitted).
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natural laws just mentioned, it reflected “a non-naturally occurring
manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human
ingenuity.”3 Patentable subject matter is inventive, the stuff of an active
human intervention to bend phenomena, both natural and man-made,
to human use.4 “Use” is the right term, because one of the requirements
for the issuance of a patent is the “utility” of the potentially patentable
material.5 Where automobiles, washers, and computer systems offer
certain evident forms of utility that make their subparts potentially
patentable, the person attracted to Earth by the planet’s gravitational
pull can be much less said to be “using” the effect of that law in any
meaningful, intentional way. In view of the utility requirement and the
Diamond dicta, the scientist receiving a patent must do more than just
passively observe and record nature for future theoretical predictions;
she must actively tinker with nature to serve the end of non-obvious
human utility.6
Trademark protection is even more obviously unavailing for the
discoverer of a scientific law or theory. As trademark protection is
3. Id. at 309-10.
4. Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 881 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9,865)
(“In its naked ordinary sense, a discovery is not patentable. A discovery of a new principle, force,
or law operating, or which can be made to operate, on matter, will not entitle the discoverer to a
patent. It is only where the explorer has gone beyond the mere domain of discovery, and has laid
hold of the new principle, force, or law, and connected it with some particular medium or
mechanical contrivance by which, or through which, it acts on the material world, that he can
secure the exclusive control of it under the patent laws. He then controls his discovery through
the means by which he has brought it into practical action, or their equivalent, and only through
them. It is then an invention, although it embraces a discovery. Sever the force or principle
discovered from the means or mechanism through which he has brought it into the domain of
invention, and it immediately falls out of that domain and eludes his grasp. It is then a naked
discovery, and not an invention.”).
5. Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms of Science, 94 NW. L. REV. 77, 106 (1999) (discussing the utility requirement in the context
of gene sequences and noting that such sequences would not be patentable until their utility was
determined).
6. Isaac Asimov’s short story, The Billiard Ball, provides a good example of the
distinction between patentable applied science and unpatentable theoretical science. In that story,
the scientist Priss develops a strictly theoretical basis for an electromagnetically-driven antigravity field that would eliminate the effects of ambient gravity to create a zero-gravity state. His
rival Bloom, renowned for his applications of Priss’ theories, uses this theory to invent a zero-g
machine. The story does not fail to mention that Bloom was careful to patent his applications of
Priss’ theories (and then exploit those inventions for his own financial gain). Priss’ work,
meanwhile, would have been ineligible for patent protection. The story comes to a head when
Priss is provided the opportunity to make the first use of Bloom’s machine by sending a billiard
ball into it. ISAAC ASIMOV, The Billiard Ball, in THE BEST OF ISAAC ASIMOV (Fawcett Crest
1973). In theory, Bloom as patent holder and Priss as simple scientist is how patent law would
mete out its monopolistic rewards. But there remains an interesting legal fiction—what should
patent law do with something that changes natural law? If Newton could not have patented gravity
hypothetically, could someone patent a never-before-observed modification of a natural law, like
“anti-gravity,” distinct from a machine to implement it?
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limited to goods and services in commerce,7 its purview could not
conceivably cover a newly-discovered scientific law. Extending
trademark protection this far would amount to declaring that “genetics”
is a good or service of Mendel, or that “gravity” was brought to the
public by Newton. Obviously, this is not the case. Neither of these
examples is a good or service in commerce; and even if natural laws
were somehow commoditized for commercial use, they would not owe
their origin to their discoverer or exploiter. The very idea of scientific
discovery is that something—e.g., a mechanical relation, a magnetic
attraction—pre-dated the discovery and continues to exist in the wake
of the discovery.8 Discovered or not, the scientific relation remains in
effect to the same extent. “Relativity” might be proper as a word mark
in trademark law, just not as attached to the scientific theory that
Einstein proposed.
Copyright is similarly unfavorable to scientific theories, at least
in their barest form. Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act clarifies that
copyright protection does not “extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work.”9 A scientific theory could easily be
classified as an idea, a system, a concept, a principle, or a discovery,
and denied protection on that basis.
At a more fundamental level of copyright law, section 102(b)
derives much of its substance from the idea-expression dichotomy,
which dictates that abstract ideas are not copyrightable, while the
specific expression embodied in a work is. While there is no good way
to distinguish an unprotected “idea” from a protected “expression,”10
the general spirit of the idea-expression dichotomy is to prevent
copyright protection from monopolizing necessary building blocks of
expression like words, stock elements, and high-level concepts. We
would not want to grant a monopoly on the idea of an absurdist story
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012), which defines a trademark to include “any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof—
(1) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register
on the principal register established by this chapter,
to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured
or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.” Id.
8. This should not be misinterpreted to mean that what is discovered or posited in a
scientific theory is the exact thing that pre-existed the theory. As shall be seen later, scientific
discoveries may reasonably be viewed as created facts, to a certain extent.
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
10. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (“Nobody has
ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.”).
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about an oversized protagonist, lest Jarry’s Ubu have blocked Ken
Toole’s A Confederacy of Dunces.11 Similar logic would seem to
dictate that the discoverer of a theory like gravity or relativity would
not be able to own the discovered theory so that others may use that
theory, alter it, and test it without running afoul of intellectual property
protections. And indeed, this is the case, at least for expressions of a
theory in its barest form of high-level statements, basic equations,
models, and diagrams. Copyright would only attach to a scientific
theory in an expanded explanation of the theory—Einstein, for
instance, wrote a book on relativity,12 which certainly merits copyright
protection generally. Yet a copyright in a work expansively describing
a theory would only apply to lengthy descriptions of the theory in
words, and not the theory’s underlying equations, ideas, hypotheses, or
models themselves.
The only possible exception to intellectual property’s lack of
protection for scientific theories is trade secret protection. The typical
formulation of material eligible for trade secret protection is any
information that provides a competitive advantage in the marketplace
by virtue of its being kept secret.13 A business could conceivably
discover a scientific theory and then keep it secret for its own personal
gain. Practically speaking, however, this is probably a rare scenario.
Consider, for example, Steven Goldberg’s comment:
It is rare for a scientific discovery to immediately lead to a
new device. More often it takes a chain of scientific
discoveries and engineering advances to bring a product to
fruition. Indeed, although inventions may in theory always
rely on some underlying scientific principle, many inventors
have little or no knowledge of scientific theory and rely
instead on their own intuitive ideas about improving previous
inventions. Numerous studies, including those related to
sophisticated post-World War II military inventions, show
that many inventions are based primarily on earlier
technology rather than on science.14

11. ALFRED JARRY, UBU ROI (Paul Negri & Drew Silver eds., Beverly Keith & Gershon
Legman trans., Dover Publications 2003) (1896); JOHN KENNEDY TOOLE, A CONFEDERACY OF
DUNCES (Louisiana St. Univ. Press 1980).
12. See generally ALBERT EINSTEIN, RELATIVITY: THE SPECIAL & GENERAL THEORY,
(Robert W. Lawson trans., Princeton Univ. Press 2015) (1915).
13. Eric Johnson, Trade Secret Subject Matter, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 545, 546 (2010).
Johnson also notes other more restrictive definitions of trade secrets in Part II, but even those
definitions would likely cover scientific theories discovered by a business. See id.
14. Steven Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75 GEO. L. J.
1341, 1344 (1987).
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While undoubtedly there are certain commercial entities engaged in
basic research, Goldberg points toward a more common division of
labor between theoretical and applied science, such that those who care
most about trade secrets are those least likely to have a new scientific
theory to protect.15 And even if a business did discover a theory and
subsequently apply trade secret protection to it, that scenario would not
prevent others from independently discovering the theory16—in which
case, the business would have no recourse against the later discoverer.
All of which would generally leave scientific theory, at least in
the form of models, diagrams, and equations, squarely in the public
domain. This seems like a reasonable state of affairs, at least in view of
certain basic principles of the sociology of science. According to
Merton’s oft-cited research, science’s aim of extending knowledge is
served by four key values: universalism, communism,
disinterestedness, and organized skepticism.17
The second value, which prizes communal ownership of the fruits
of scientific discovery,18 would seem anathema to the application of
intellectual property rights to basic theories. Lest concerns remain that
a lack of such proprietary rights erode incentives to conduct basic
theoretical research, scientific culture has established its own set of
alternative incentives supporting such research, including rewards,
honors, career advancement, and the intrinsic satisfaction of making a
meaningful discovery.19 Further, science’s accretive nature—one
might think here of the line often misattributed to Newton that he saw
farther because he stood on the shoulders of giants20—militates in favor
of a broader commons whereby scientists may take advantage of the
fundamental research of their predecessors without the transaction
costs associated with intellectual property licensing.
Is it really inconceivable, however, to imagine a world where
basic science might be protected by proprietary rights? In the first half
of the twentieth century, numerous regimes for the proprietary
protection of basic science were proposed in Europe.21 The rationale
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (AM. LAW INST.
1995) (“Independent discovery and analysis of publicly available products or information are not
improper means of acquisition.”).
17. Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property Law and Basic Science: Extinguishing
Prometheus?, 10 LAW IN CONTEXT 56, 67 (1992). Dan Burk also includes “originality” on the list
as a fifth member. Dan Burk, Research Misconduct: Deviance, Due Process, and the
Disestablishment of Science, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 305, 310 (1995).
18. Drahos, supra note 17.
19. Id. at 69.
20. The line likely owes its origin to Bernard de Chartres.
21. See generally Thomas R. Ilosvay, Scientific Property, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 178 (1953).
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behind such proposals was the failure of the then-current incentive
system to promote fundamental scientific research.22 While that
incentive system may have evolved substantially in the near century
since such proposals initially appeared, concerns over equitable
remuneration for scientific discovery may still be well placed. If the
discovery and development of a basic scientific theory were to lead
directly, via a separate commercial entity’s basic application of the
theory, to a very popular product (a hypothetical that is not so farfetched), then perhaps the possibility of winning an award or receiving
other forms of recognition does not sufficiently protect the scientist
making the original discovery. That was precisely the problem at the
heart of the rivalry in Isaac Asimov’s The Billiard Ball—the applied
scientist made all the money while the theoretical scientist whose work
underpinned the applied scientist’s remained relegated to relative
obscurity.23
In view of this problematic scenario, let us offer the remainder of
this article as its own sort of scientific theory, or perhaps put more
correctly, meta-scientific theory. We shall begin with a hypothesis, test
it through a series of arguments, and try to reach a conclusion based on
the results of the arguments. The hypothesis initially in question?
Scientific theories are a proper subject of intellectual property
protection.
Yet this hypothesis can be refined even further in view of the
limits of current regimes of intellectual property protection. Attempting
to accommodate protection of scientific theories within trademark law
would be a fool’s errand—non-commercial natural phenomena are
conceptually too distinct from the commercial confusion and dilution
protected by trademark law to suggest a meaningful bridge to that gap.
Trade secret, while potentially offering a modicum of protection to the
private discovery of a scientific theory, is very likely to be time-limited,
particularly if the scientific theory is just waiting to be discovered by a
different party.24 And either way, if the hypothesis aims to test long22. Id. at 179 (“But seldom does [the scientist] receive equitable remuneration for his
services. The concept of scientific property contemplates legal protection of the scientist's
interests by recognizing that he has a right to an appropriate award on account of the industrial
application of his scientific discovery or theoretical invention.”).
23. ASIMOV, supra note 6.
24. It is assumed here that a sufficient number of potential discoverers exists such that
some combination of scientific norms promoting publication of discoveries and an eroded value
in keeping a given theory secret will lead to public disclosure of the theory. At worst, the secret
would become a secret de Polichinelle. Practically speaking, however, this may not be the case.
For example, very few people have both access to, and knowledge of, something as sophisticated
as the Large Hadron Collider at CERN. If CERN were a private entity, that entity could choose
not to share its findings with little risk of those theories alternatively being discovered. See
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term protection for publicly circulating theories, then trade secret is
simply inapposite.
These initial refinements in the hypothesis leave patents and
copyrights as potential anchoring points for the intellectual property
protection of scientific theory. Yet patents also seem to be a
questionable choice. As already mentioned, patent protections require
utility—something hard to imagine in the case of a scientific theory in
the absence of a step applying the theory. So, patent law would need to
be rewritten for this one-off case.
Patents present additional complications when considered in
connection with scientific theories. One is infringement—if Newton
had been able to patent gravity, what would it mean to “practice”
gravity such that one infringed Newton? It might mean using the
equations underlying the theory, in which case all scientists working
with Newton’s theory might potentially infringe the theory. It might
even mean to make use of gravity, in which case Newton would have
enjoyed a twenty-year monopoly over keeping all humans planted on
Earth. Somewhat related to this reductio ad absurdum is the
woodenness of patent law in its protections. Professor Peter Lee has
spoken of the importance of intellectual property in making a
distinction between unprotectable “infrastructure” and protectable
“application.”25 Scientific theories currently fall on the side of
infrastructure—free for use by anyone who wishes to apply them in
their own work (and potentially, to receive intellectual protection in
such applications of the theoretical infrastructure).
While copyright and trademark laws feature certain exceptions
that maintain a robust infrastructure—like fair use, the idea/expression
dichotomy, and genericide—patent law is less flexible.26 Patent holders
effectively can block the practice of their patents for the twenty-year
life of a patent.27 This situation would be especially problematic in the
case of patents on scientific theories because such theories are more
likely to be upstream of further inventions applying them. So, any
patent holder in a scientific theory would have potentially much greater
Drahos, supra note 17, at 64 (“At the same time, the cost of industry r&d [sic] has continued to
rise. The cost of major science facilities, like particle accelerators, which most countries see as
essential to maintaining a high technology capability, amount to billions of dollars. Obtaining
scientific truth is now a multi-billion dollar enterprise.” (citations omitted)).
25. See generally Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV.
39 (2008).
26. Id. at 45.
27. Id. at 41. Technically, patent law does have an exception to infringement liability for
“experimental use,” but that exception is limited to “strictly philosophical purposes that have no
commercial application.” Rai, supra note 5, at 139. It is not clear that even that exception would
overcome patent blocking in the hypothetical space of non-applied science.
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influence when enforcing that patent than an inventor simply protecting
a patented invention. Instead of the one-to-one comparison between
patented invention and potentially infringing device, the scientific
theory patent might preempt a broad range of unrelated fields and
applications using the theory (and thereby stifling innovation).
Accordingly, patent law seems ill-suited as a protective regime for
scientific theory.
That leaves copyright.28 With due respect to commentators who
believe that copyright deals “with the arts and [has] no obvious
relevance to science at all,”29 that view misconceives the fluidity that
exists between the aesthetic and artistic, on one hand, and the utilitarian
and scientific, on the other. Marcel Duchamp’s ready-mades were little
more than utilitarian objects transplanted directly into the world of art.
Emile Zola’s Roman Expérimental project described how the
novelist—more particularly, the naturalist novelist—could reduce the
act of writing a novel to the experimental method of the physician
Claude Bernard.30 The latter, it should be recalled, viewed
experimental science as leading to a form of absolute certainty, where
certain initial conditions in the human body could be shown to lead to
corresponding, and correspondingly certain, pathological outcomes.31
Literature for Zola and science for Bernard were, at least in Zola’s
view, one in the same. Meanwhile, as we shall see in more detail later,32
the arrow directing science into the space of art is bidirectional—
artistic and aesthetic tendencies are also capable of informing the
process of scientific discovery, which cannot reasonably be reduced to
so many dry, un-copyrightable facts. Once there are forms of
mechanical literature and aesthetic science, then the simple binary
categorization between science and art loses its probative force.
Perhaps in recognition of this fluidity, copyright has developed to
protect more than just traditionally artistic and aesthetic works.
28. Technically, theories might also be granted sui generis protection, the likes of which
have already been granted for vessel hulls and semiconductor designs. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-32
(2012); 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14. However, in the interest of working with an established body of law
featuring certain helpful doctrines like fair use, copyright will be the subject of the hypothesis
here. Sui generis protection for scientific theories could serve as the basis for a different article
under a different hypothesis. Appropriately so, for as we shall see a little later, science is a space
where hypotheses abound.
29. Drahos, supra note 17, at 58.
30. See generally EMILE ZOLA, LE ROMAN EXPÉRIMENTAL (G. Charpentier ed., 2d ed.
1880), http://bit.do/Zola_Le-Roman-Experimental.
31. See generally CLAUDE BERNARD, INTRODUCTION À L’ÉTUDE DE LA MÉDECINE
EXPÉRIMENTALE, (Paris, Bailliére et Fils 1865), http://bit.do/Bernard_LEtude-MedecineExperimentale.
32. See infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text.
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Copyright has been found sufficiently broad to protect dryer content
like used car prices,33 forms compiling baseball statistics,34 and
computer software.35 Because of a variety of limits built into copyright
law (of which are not present in patent law), granting protection to
these classes of more functional works is not particularly problematic
as a matter of the scope of monopoly. Thanks to the idea-expression
dichotomy, a specific set of used car prices might be copyrightable if
they reflect the price author’s judgment; but the act of setting used car
prices, with or without judgment, is not copyrightable. Others may then
seek their own copyright prices through their own separate acts of
judgment. Similarly, the application of copyright theory to a selected
set of statistics in a specific form does not foreclose use of any of the
individual statistics within that form, or the compilation of another
form using a different set of statistics. Due to the restrictions in section
102(b), software copyright protection does not extend to the
functionality of the program, just the expression of that functionality.36
And in each case, the mere user of the copyrighted work will not
infringe the original without exercising any of the rights protected by
the Copyright Act.37 In other words, if the consumer of the used car
prices, stats sheet, or software, merely uses the copyrighted artifact
without copying, distributing, modifying, or displaying that artifact,
then the use is not within the ambit of the Copyright Act.
All of these limits commend copyright as a candidate for the
potential intellectual property protection of scientific theories. Much as
copyright protects computer code that contains dry content intended to
support functionality by protecting only the expression of that
functionality, so too might a scientific theory be properly viewed as a
form of expression worthy of protection in the observation and
prediction of a particular phenomenon. That expression might be
viewed as protectable without reaching the underlying idea of the
theory. Further, unlike patent law whose protections would
hypothetically impact the use of natural laws if such laws were
patentable, copyright’s limited set of rights would not impact a mere
user of the scientific theory protected by copyright (presuming no other
protected rights were implicated in the user’s activity). Copyright
offers the further attribute of fair use, which would allow many
applications of protected scientific theory without requiring the license
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

CCC Info. Serv. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1994).
Kregos v. Associated Press, Inc., 937 F.2d 700, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991).
Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983).
17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
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necessary in a patent-blocking situation. So, let us update the
hypothesis proposed for the scientific experiment (or meta-experiment)
proposed here: Scientific theory is the proper subject of copyright
protection.
To test this theory, this Article will rely in no small part on the
epistemology and philosophy of science of Pierre Duhem. Who was
Duhem? He was something of a modern Renaissance man in the world
of science.38 During Duhem’s lifetime (1861-1916),39 theoretical
science witnessed massive upheaval, upheaval in which he
participated, if on the “losing” team.
With the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries came the
growth of Darwin’s evolutionary biology, James Clerk Maxwell’s
electro-magnetism, Clausius and thermodynamics, Boltzmann’s
statistical mechanics, the adoption of atomic theory, and, of course, the
arrival of relativity via Einstein. Lost in the shuffle of these nowtextbook fields of scientific study is the domain of energetics. Often
associated with the work of Wilhelm Ostwald,40 energetics proposed
the study of the flow and transformation of energy. Duhem’s work
supplemented Ostwald’s; to this day, the Gibbs-Duhem equation—
measuring the amount of free energy in a system based on its volume
and temperature—still bears his name.
Despite his contributions to theoretical science, Duhem picked the
wrong theory to support. Because of energetics’ focus on what moves
between objects, it came to serve as an antithesis to atomic theory’s
object-oriented approach.41 With proof of the existence of atoms in the
38. Pierre Humbert estimates Duhem’s talent worthy of a professorial chair at the Sorbonne
(a chair that he never achieved, instead remaining in Bordeaux for much of his career). PIERRE
HUMBERT, LES MAÎTRES D’UNE GÉNÉRATION, PIERRE DUHEM 16 (Paris, Librairie Bloud et Gay
1932), http://bit.do/Les-Maitres-dune-Generation. To demonstrate the scope of Duhem’s talents,
one need look no further than the titles of Humbert’s chapters in his biography of Duhem—“[t]he
man,” “[t]he physicist,” “[t]he philosopher,” “[t]he historian,” and “[t]he master.” Stanley Jaki
refers to Duhem as “a giant of the intellect.” STANLEY L. JAKI, SCIENTIST AND CATHOLIC: PIERRE
DUHEM 17 (Christendom Press 1991).
39. HUMBERT, supra note 38, at 9-10.
40. A good description of the debate between Ostwald’s energetics and Boltzmann’s
mechanics is available, see, for example, ÉTIENNE KLEIN, LE FACTEUR TEMPS NE SONNE JAMAIS
DEUX FOIS (Éditions Flammarion 2007).
41. HUMBERT, supra note 38, at 56; see, e.g., PIERRE DUHEM, L’ÉVOLUTION DE LA
MÉCANIQUE (J. Vrin 2000) (1903) translated in PIERRE DUHEM, THE EVOLUTION OF MECHANICS
(G. Æ. Oravas ed., Michael Cole trans., Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers 1980).
Duhem’s 1903 book details, among other things, his view of the conflict between atomicallyfocused theory and his preferred non-atomic view. Id. at 87-88. Where theory based on the
presumption of the existence of atoms (then not proven to exist, it should be noted) required
somewhat strained calculations that sacrificed precision in Duhem’s view, Lagrangian mechanics,
based only on the relation between artificial parts of a system (though not necessarily atoms),
offered a better means of understanding that system. Id.
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early-twentieth century, energetics was largely discarded, relegated to
a footnote in the annals of science along with constructs like
phlogiston42 and ether.43 Despite the gradual rejection of energetics,
which had already begun during Duhem’s life, he always considered
himself a scientist first and foremost—he even went so far as to reject
an academic promotion that would move him from Bordeaux to Paris
because the position was not for a physicist, but for a historian of
science.44
Yet it was in this latter field that Duhem made some of his most
notable contributions. Much of his work concerned the period between
ancient Greek science and Galileo—a period comprised, in large part,
of the Middle Ages. Duhem’s arduous research into this supposedly
fallow period for science tended to show that rather than present a
lacuna between the Romans and the Renaissance, the science of the
Middle Ages contributed directly to the developments of the
Renaissance.45 Specifically, Galileo’s discoveries followed from an
unbroken chain of scientific thought dating at least back to 1200 AD.46
At the time of his passing, Duhem was in the process of expanding his
historical work into what was intended to become a twelve-volume
encyclopedia of the history of science from Plato to Copernicus.47 As
if that weren’t enough, beyond the practice of theoretical science and
its history, Duhem’s work even reached the domains of epistemology
and the philosophy of science. This Article will rely on many notions
familiar to Duhemian philosophy of science in constructing its
arguments for and against copyright protection in scientific theory.
It bears note here why the philosophy of science generally, and
Duhem’s philosophy of science, more specifically, serve to structure
the polemic presented here. To answer the first question, inflecting the
philosophy of science to address questions of how law should treat
42. Phlogiston was the substance proposed to explain combustibility. THOMAS S. KUHN,
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, & Charles Morris
eds., Univ. of Chicago Press, 2d ed. 2012) (discussing at length its ultimate failure as a scientific
construct).
43. Ether, like phlogiston, was a fictitious scientific creation inserted in pre-Relativity
models to explain certain deviations from Newton’s theory in the behavior of light. See, e.g.,
PIERRE DUHEM, LA THÉORIE PHYSIQUE: SON OBJET, SA STRUCTURE 29-30 (J. Vrin 2007) (1906)
translated in PIERRE DUHEM, THE AIM AND STRUCTURE OF PHYSICAL THEORY (Philip P. Wiener
trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1954) [hereinafter DUHEM, LA THÉORIE PHYSIQUE].
44. HUMBERT, supra note 38, at 17-18.
45. Id. at 89.
46. Id.
47. See 1 PIERRE DUHEM, LE SYSTÈME DU MONDE: HISTOIRE DES DOCTRINES
COSMOLOGIQUES DE PLATON À COPERNIC (A. Hermann 1913) and subsequent volumes, of which
seven volumes had appeared in print at the time of Humbert’s biography. HUMBERT, supra note
38, at 106.
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science adds an additional, authentic dimension beyond basic policy
concerns more internal to the law itself. Recalling Timothy Terrell’s
Flatlaw article, law as a “Flatlaw” system may be viewed as a twodimensional, self-contained space of internal rules.48 Yet that space
might also be transcended, where law’s two dimensions serve as a subcomponent of a three-dimensional space—a reflection of “larger social
phenomena” guiding the law from the exterior.49 Terrell lists
“community standards of morality and justice, economic efficiency,
group behavior,” and “social and political forces”50 as examples of
phenomena that might add a transcendent dimension to the study of
law. Here, it is proposed that the philosophy of science furnish a further
transcendent dimension by which to consider the legal protections of
science from outside the law itself. And a particularly authentic
dimension at that, as the philosophy of science normally does for
science, what the larger social phenomena mentioned by Terrell can do
for the law—they place a domain in contact with itself through a form
of external circuitry or added dimensionality. What the philosophy of
science can do for science itself, it might just as well do for the law of
science—at least we will work from that assumption.
But why Duhem’s philosophy of science, in particular? Duhem,
of course, is not the only philosopher of science, and any number of
other such philosophies could serve equally well, if in very different
ways,51 when held up to the possibility of protecting a scientific theory
through copyright law. Some of these possibilities will be presented in
any event, but Duhem’s theory represents a reasonable spine both due
to its generality and due to a few critical ways in which his view of
science reflects a way of thinking currently applicable to copyright law.
Additionally, where Duhem’s theories run into conceptual trouble—as
we shall see—is precisely where the application of copyright to
scientific theory runs into trouble. So even though Duhem was not a
copyright scholar, or even a legal theorist or a lawyer, his theories are
particularly well-suited to address questions of copyright law in the
space of science.

48. Timothy P. Terrell, Flatlaw: An Essay on the Dimensions of Legal Reasoning and the
Development of Fundamental Normative Principles, 72 CAL. L. REV. 288 (1984).
49. Id. at 303-04.
50. Id. at 304.
51. To name a few possibilities, one could also rely on the mechanistic philosophy of
science of a La Mettrie or a Jacques Monod, a theologically-inspired, deductive method à la
Descartes, the theory of “personal knowledge” of Polanyi, the doctrine of falsifiability of Karl
Popper, the more anarchistic scientific theory of Feyerabend, or the vitalism of Lamarck, Bergson,
or Bichat.
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This Article was undertaken with no preconceived conclusion, in
the spirit of the scientific value of “disinterestedness” proposed by
Merton.52 It will test the hypothesis that copyright law might protect
scientific theory openly, by marshalling evidence for both sides of the
debate. This certainly could be organized as a dialogue in the nature of
Galileo’s Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi, with an updated form
of Salviati, in favor of changing copyright law to protect scientific
theory, conversing with a more conservative Simplicio in favor of
keeping the laws as they are. Yet that might be a bit hard to follow,
with a certain layering of circularity preventing meaningful conclusion.
Instead, Part II of the Article will present the case for protecting
scientific theory under copyright law. Part III will present the case
against such protection. In both cases, the arguments will remain
mostly restricted to the philosophy of science, with limited forays into
the sociology of science. Rather than rely on empirically unsupported
assertions the likes of “scientific research is currently adequately
incentivized” or “scientific research is not properly incentivized”—the
philosophy of science will provide a more concrete structure whereby
such direct, unsupported contradictions may be at least partially
avoided. Part IV will offer a conclusion based on the merits of the
arguments in Parts II and III. In that way, the hypothesis offered here
will be subject to rigorous testing and experimentation to see if it
should be accepted as a theoretical possibility, or on the other hand, if
it should be set aside like another energetics or phlogiston.
I. AN ARGUMENT TO PROTECT SCIENTIFIC THEORY UNDER
COPYRIGHT LAW
When attempting to determine the utility of a scientific theory, the
traditional distinction between realism and rationalism is of central
53
importance. According to realism, a scientific theory—or any other
fact, for that matter—represents an objective truth, a truth that preexists
specific human perception and remains exterior to human perception
54
even having been perceived. The scientific fact, model, or theory is
not merely a subjective construction; it is reality. The scientist
operating in a realist framework does not create the models that she
proposes; she merely reveals a relation that was there prior to the

52. Drahos, supra note 17.
53. GASTON BACHELARD, LE NOUVEL ESPRIT SCIENTIFIQUE 5-6 (Les Presses
Universitaires de France 2013) (1934).
54. BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF
SCIENTIFIC FACTS 180 (Princeton Univ. Press 1986) (1979).
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55

discovery. According to rationalism, by contrast, scientific theory is
a creation of the human mind—an artificial and subjective intermediary
used by humans to subject the ever-distinct outside world to more
rigorous organization or classification. The fact or scientific model is
not merely revealed in rationalism; it is created by a series of social
56
actors and forces. Where realism is the province of an empirical
worldview that presumes potential contact with the foundations of the
reality observed, rationalism favors a more theoretically-motivated
57
approach that applies a gloss of human creation to what is observed.
Of course, when the two doctrines are considered in close interplay,
each can be viewed as wrapping around the other. For realism to
envelop rationalism, one need only view the supposedly rational
creation of the human mind as immediately integrated into an evergrowing reality. For rationalism to envelop realism, one need only treat
the supposedly real laws discovered by direct contact with reality as a
58
creation of the mind.
Despite the apparent insolubility in the dichotomy separating—or
perhaps incomprehensibly muddling—rationalism and realism, the
former seems the better-supported approach by which to view modern
scientific research and theory. The sociologist Bruno Latour explains
the rationalism built into just such research, but then subtly evacuated
in the ultimate scientific theory. Such is the outcome of a process of
59
division and inversion. At the outset of a new scientific project—one
seeking a new molecule, for example—a number of hypotheses may
be proposed regarding the structure and composition of the
undiscovered molecule. As the molecule’s structure is discovered with
a greater degree of certainty, the hypothesis that ends up successfully
reflecting that structure assumes a sort of double meaning—on the one
hand, as a mere description in words signifying the newly discovered
60
molecule, and on the other, as the actual molecule itself. With the
molecule’s newfound reality, the first of these two meanings
61
increasingly splits off and is discarded in favor of the second.
Meanwhile, the temporal orientation of the process of scientific
discovery undergoes an artificial inversion. Where that process
originally posited the molecule as an artificial pre-condition of
55. Id. at 178.
56. Id.
57. BACHELARD, supra note 53, at 13 (discussing how neither one nor the other is an
appropriate theoretical perspective for the entirety of physical theory).
58. Id. at 6 (suggesting these doubled constructions).
59. LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 54, at 181.
60. Id. at 180.
61. Id.
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research, the ultimately discovered molecule seems to provide a post
hoc justification for the original hypothesis, such that the discovered
molecule can be treated as having always existed. This leads to the
realist’s tautology whereby the nature of external objects can only be
62
described by the words chosen to constitute them. A rationalist view
that conceives of such words as a construction or layer artificially
added to reality better describes the products of theoretical science. As
a final point in favor of rationalism, a realist viewpoint is hard to square
with the nature of science, which François Jacob qualified as “partial”
63
and “temporary.” If scientific theory ever reflected reality in its
fullness, the theory achieving such perfection would never be replaced.
Yet as scientific discovery from ancient Greece until the present has
repeatedly shown, no scientific construct intended to reflect reality has
achieved anything more than a temporary hegemony over other
theories and a close approximation in its predictive calculations.
Pierre Duhem reaches a similar outcome via a slightly different
approach. One of his earliest points in La Théorie Physique, Son Objet,
Sa Structure is to question what a physical theory really is. A theory
might be defined in one of two ways—either as an explanation of the
64
reality that it models or as a summary of that same reality. The
explanation/summary dichotomy in many ways maps isomorphically
to the rationalist/realist dichotomy. Theory as explanation would be
akin to realism, in that the physical theory aspires to explain reality as
it is, right down to the final causes that account for attractive or
repulsive forces. Theory as mere summary is more rationalist in its
reserve, as a summary theory only aspires to predict the mathematical
parameters of the relations between objects. Newton’s theory of gravity
provides a good example of this conflict, and its creator’s ostensible
65
belief that his theory was merely a summary. Newton’s equations
provided a highly-effective model to predict the mechanical motion of
various objects in space, such that the freefall of an initially still
cannonball from a tower to the ground could be predicted with a high
degree of accuracy. Yet that set of mathematical relations does not
justify more far-reaching hypotheses as to why the cannonball falls as
66
it does. To take this additional step, Duhem argues, is to render a
67
physical theory subordinate to a metaphysical system, which, in turn,
62. Id. at 183.
63. FRANÇOIS JACOB, LE JEU DES POSSIBLES : ESSAI SUR LA DIVERSITÉ DU VIVANT 11
(1981) (« partiel » and « provisoire » are his words).
64. DUHEM, LA THÉORIE PHYSIQUE, supra note 43, at 27.
65. Id. at 80-81.
66. Id. at 81.
67. Id. at 31.
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renders that explanatory physical theory inconsistent with other
explanatory physical theories subordinate to different metaphysical
68
systems inconsistent with the original’s. Asking why of a physical
theory via hypothesis introduces the further risk of injecting occult
69
qualities into science. For example, when the seventeenth-century
Cartesian philosopher Malebranche considered the phenomenon of
billiard balls striking each other, he did not limit his theory to a simple
model of the direction and magnitude of the balls’ movement on the
table, he saw the striking of the ball’s as a means of carrying out the
70
will of the divine agent governing the balls.
A step like
Malebranche’s might lead to a clearer notion of reality under his
metaphysical system, but it exceeds the rationalist charge of physics as
conceived by Duhem. As he notes, “A physical theory is not an
explanation. It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from
a small number of principles, which have the goal of representing as
simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible, a group of
71
experimental laws.”
This rupture between scientific theory as explanatory hypothesis
and scientific theory as mere mathematical summary tracks a
dichotomy that Duhem explored in depth in his book Sauver les
72
apparences. The dichotomy in question divides the scientific role of
the “astronomer” from the role of the “physicist.” The task of the
astronomer is merely to construct a model that simulates the external
world as completely and accurately as possible based on the external
73
appearances of what is being modeled. The astronomer does not pose
deeper metaphysical questions of a scientific theory, and will accept it
as sufficient if it accurately predicts, for example, the location of a star
or the behavior of weights on a lever. The physicist, by contrast, is
74
concerned with deeper metaphysical questions.
This concern
translates to a requirement to select among a series of equally
supportable hypotheses to determine which best suits a given

68. Id. at 36.
69. Id. at 38-39.
70. NICOLAS MALEBRANCHE, DE LA RECHERCHE DE LA VÉRITÉ, at 447 (J. Vrin 2006)
translated in NICOLAS MALEBRANCHE, THE SEARCH AFTER TRUTH, at 448 (Thomas M. Lennon
& Paul J. Olscamp eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1674-75).
71. DUHEM, LA THÉORIE PHYSIQUE, supra note 43, at 44.
72. PIERRE DUHEM, SAUVER LES APPARENCES : SUR LA NOTION DE THÉORIE PHYSIQUE DE
PLATON À GALILÉE (J. Vrin 2d ed. 2005) (1908) translated in PIERRE DUHEM, TO SAVE THE
PHENOMENA: AN ESSAY ON THE IDEA OF PHYSICAL THEORY FROM PLATO TO GALILEO (Univ. of
Chicago Press 1985) (1969) [hereinafter DUHEM, TO SAVE THE PHENOMENA].
73. Id. at 15-20.
74. Id.

18

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 34

75

metaphysical system. So for the astronomer, the distinction between
equally likely hypotheses is no great matter; for the physicist, it is all
76
that matters. In his historical trace of the astronomer/physicist
dichotomy from the time of Aristotle until the sixteenth century,
77
Duhem concludes with a reproach of Kepler and Galilee, who
abandoned the astronomer’s reserve in favor of a physician’s
metaphysics. For Duhem, scientific theory is merely the model and the
associated set of mathematical equations, not the hypothesis or set of
hypotheses that inform it.
Indeed, scientific theory viewed as mere mathematical summary
creates a divergence between the theory’s content and the hypotheses
informing it. On each side of the balance, a certain degree of freedom
necessarily remains. Along the lines of what we have seen, Duhem
notes that
more often, physical theory cannot attain [a high] degree of
perfection; it cannot offer itself as a certain explanation of
perceptible appearances; the reality that it proclaims to reside
beneath these appearances it cannot make accessible to our
senses; it must make do with proving that all of our
perceptions are produced as if reality was what the law
78
affirms; such a theory is a hypothetical explanation.
Yet no hypothetical explanation exists to the certain exclusion of all
79
others. Hypotheses may form the basis for a theory, but they need
80
only be logically consistent when taken together. So if one wishes to
hypothesize, as Malebranche did, that a divine force propagates
movement among billiard balls, that hypothesis is acceptable as one
way of imagining that mechanical interaction. Others, however, might
view other hypothetical causes at work which are equally valid,
because equally unprovable. This fluidity, and potentially infinite
growth, in hypothetical systems flows from Duhem’s proposition that
81
there is no such thing as an experimentum crucis. The latter, it may
be recalled, is a logical construction by which hypotheses may be tested
experimentally and winnowed serially by a sort of process of
elimination. If, for example, there were but two possible hypotheses for
75. Id.
76. Id. at 36.
77. Id. at 146-48.
78. DUHEM, LA THÉORIE PHYSIQUE, supra note 43, at 29.
79. DUHEM, supra note 41, at 77-78, 81. Duhem speaks of the rupture in the mechanics of
his time between those who posited the existence of atoms and those that did not. Each was an
acceptable view in terms of the consequences drawn from each theory.
80. DUHEM, LA THÉORIE PHYSIQUE, supra note 43, at 44.
81. Id. at 265-66.
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a given phenomenon—Duhem provides light as either a particle or a
82
wave as an example of two such hypotheses —then one experiment
designed to distinguish between the two hypotheses would lead to the
certain rejection of one and the acceptance of the other. What the
proponent of the experimentum crucis forgets, however, is that
hypotheses three, four, five, and so on are also equally possible and
have not been tested. The near-infinite overgrowth of hypotheses
possible for a given phenomenon is not amenable to much metaphorical
trimming either, as any experiment produces its own internal,
insurmountable complexities. Such complexities flow from the number
of conditions needed to control a phenomenon experimentally, the
remarkable edifice of theory implied by a given experiment, the tooling
relied upon for experimentation, and other sources of error that remain
inevitable. Hypotheses grow with alacrity, in Duhem’s view, and
shrink with hesitation.
The same may be said of mathematical models. There remains an
irresolvable difference between empirically-observed facts and the
83
mathematical equations used to model them. In that difference
resides a good bit of mobility in translation between a practical fact and
its theoretical representation. A single observed fact may thereby fan
84
out into an “infinity” of theoretical representations. The mathematical
equations and associated theoretical constructions are not a mere oneto-one proposition with respect to reality; they are open to infinite
variation and permutation. So, both hypotheses and mathematical
models typically offer a freedom in construction that goes well beyond
the often-singular set of equations presented for a given theory. If
85
Newton had been inclined to hypothesize, an infinite number of
hypotheses might have explained gravity. And if he had wanted to alter
his mathematical model, an infinite number of additional equations
might have effectively served the same mathematical end.
The notable exception in Duhem’s theory to science’s realm of
86
endless possibilities is what he calls la classification naturelle, the
natural classification. The natural classification is a point of passage by
which a theory becomes more than a mere arbitrary layer of
82. Id. at 264.
83. Id. at 191.
84. Id. at 192. See also DUHEM, supra note 41, at 50 (highlighting that when one attempts
to describe the forces at play in a mechanical system, there remains at all times the possibility of
substituting an infinity of alternative forces to describe that movement).
85. There remains some debate as to whether Newton actually intended to hypothesize as
to the underlying cause or meaning of gravity. But Newton himself claimed to avoid that
temptation. See DUHEM, supra note 41, at 34.
86. DUHEM, LA THÉORIE PHYSIQUE, supra note 43, at 50.
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mathematical laws and hypotheses placed between reality and the
scientific observer. Without going so far as to explain the fundamental
reality of the phenomena modeled, a theory touching on the natural
classification achieves a reflection of the “real affinities” at play in
87
those very phenomena. Again, science does not satisfy the realist’s
ambitions via a natural classification—Duhem is still careful to use the
88
word “image” to describe even the most perfected theories. Yet it
does asymptotically seem to reach an evanescent point of contact
89
joining the logical and the ontological. In view of this ethereal
perfection, it is not surprising that natural classifications do not come
around particularly often. Duhem reserves the designation for only
those theories that have achieved a high degree of perfection in their
predictive function and often, a high degree of aesthetic beauty in their
90
articulation.
With a sufficient background in Duhem’s philosophy of science
in tow, we can now return to the hypothesis proposed here—that the
models, equations, and hypotheses of a scientific theory might be
worthy of copyright protection. To merit copyright protection, a work
must qualify as “original” within the meaning of the Copyright Act.
“Originality” is comprised of two elements: (1) original creation by the
author or creator of the work, and (2) evidence of a modicum of
91
creativity in the work. Each of these requirements merits attention
when considering the potential copyrightability of scientific theory.
As to the originality of creation of a scientific theory, the
discussion of the distinction between rationalism and realism has
tended to demonstrate that a scientific theory is not merely the product
of nature or a set of dry facts. Were it simply the scientist’s job to reveal
the inner workings of nature in its theoretical form, then the resulting
theory would scarcely qualify as original to the scientist; it would be
original to the external universe being studied. As the Supreme Court
has noted,
It is this bedrock principle of copyright that mandates the
law's seemingly disparate treatment of facts and factual
compilations. No one may claim originality as to facts. This
is because facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship.
The distinction is one between creation and discovery: the
first person to find and report a particular fact has not created
the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence. To
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 52.
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id. at 50.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
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borrow from Burrow-Giles, one who discovers a fact is not its
92
“maker” or “originator.”
Scientific discoveries, however, are not simple facts. As Latour
explained, the development and experimentation that lead to a new
scientific fact or theory are not simply a process of revelation or
discovery, but of creation.93 The scientist, by a trick of inversion, may
ultimately lead colleagues and the consuming public to believe that a
given theory is reality; yet this is an incorrect way of couching the
theory. Minus this artificial inversion, scientific theory is revealed for
what it really is—something that did not exist prior to the scientist’s
creation of it. Duhem’s philosophy would reach a similar conclusion
via the distinction between scientific theory as summary and scientific
theory as explanation. As the proper ambit of theory is a summary in
Duhem’s view, theory can never achieve the pure reflection of reality
that would reduce it to mere fact. Indeed, scientific theory is neither
94
true nor false in the manner of a common-sense fact; it is merely an
95
approximation, one of many possible summaries of a given natural
phenomenon. So, in view of either a Latourian or Duhemian
perspective, the first of the two requirements of originality under the
Copyright Act seems satisfied here.
That leaves the question of creativity, and once again, the view of
scientific theory as proposed by Duhem would seem capable of
evidencing just such creativity. By almost any measure that a court
might use when determining the presence of creativity in a work, a
scientific theory might potentially merit copyright protection as
creative. One might first consider the case originating the creativity
standard in copyright, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co. In that case, the Supreme Court considered the
96
copyrightability of the traditional white pages of a phone directory,
and ultimately denied copyright protection to the phone directory
97
because it was not sufficiently creative. Although the Court was not
particularly clear in what actually did qualify as sufficiently “creative,”
it did leave a few clues here and there in its opinion. On the one hand,
the Court set a very low bar for the creativity necessary to merit
98
copyright protection—a “modicum” of creativity would suffice. It
92.
93.

Id. at 347 (citations omitted).
See BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, The Creation of Order Out of Disorder, in
LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 54, at 235-38, 244-46.
94. DUHEM, LA THÉORIE PHYSIQUE, supra note 43, at 242.
95. Id.
96. Feist, 499 U.S. at 342-44.
97. Id. at 342-44, 363.
98. Id. at 346.
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further clarified, “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low;
even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the
grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, no matter how
99
crude, humble or obvious it might be.” Yet the Court found the white
100
pages at issue to be entirely “garden-variety” and “devoid of even
101
the slightest trace of creativity.” What qualifies as “creative” may
not be very clear, yet it is clear that very little creativity is necessary to
satisfy this standard, and that only the most rote and obvious works—
like a strictly alphabetical listing of names and their phone numbers—
will fail to evidence sufficient creativity.
If the Court’s language in Feist is generally vague and
tautological, lower courts have attempted to provide precision as to
what creativity might mean in the context of copyright law. The Federal
102
Circuit’s recent decision in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc.,
represents one common approach to creativity, by looking to the
presence of sufficient alternative forms of expression for a given idea.
As the court noted when considering the copyrightability of Oracle’s
Java language, “copyrightability is focused on the choices available to
103
the plaintiff at the time the computer program was created.”
Similarly, Google’s Android operating system could be found
infringing of the copyrightable Java language because, among other
reasons, “Google could have structured Android differently and could
have chosen different ways to express and implement the functionality
104
that it copied.” The Second Circuit in Matthew Bender & Co. v. West
105
Publishing Co., offered a similar view as to copyrightable creativity,
“when it comes to the selection or arrangement of information,
creativity inheres in making non-obvious choices from among more
106
than a few options.”
Still other courts have relied on similar
107
reasoning when determining a work’s copyrightability. So thus far,
99. Id. at 345.
100. Id. at 362.
101. Id.
102. Oracle Am. Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
103. Id. at 1370.
104. Id. at 1368.
105. Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998).
106. Id. at 682.
107. See, for example, Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977 (7th
Cir. 1997), where the Court reasoned that classifications or taxonomies might merit copyright
protection because
[c]lassification is a creative endeavor. Butterflies may be grouped by their color,
or the shape of their wings, or their feeding or breeding habits, or their habitats, or
the attributes of their caterpillars, or the sequence of their DNA; each scheme of
classification could be expressed in multiple ways. Dental procedures could be
classified by complexity, or by the tools necessary to perform them, or by the parts
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creativity appears to require both an element of authorial selection or
judgment by a work’s creator, and the presence of sufficient alternative
expressive alternatives available to the creator making such a selection
in view of the work’s unprotectable idea.
The creation of a scientific theory is capable of satisfying each of
these elements under Duhem’s philosophy. This much may be shown
both for scientific theory as a set of hypotheses and for scientific theory
as a set of mathematical symbols, equations, or models. To model the
movement of the Sun, traditional astronomy could propose either an
eccentric circle or an epicycle, and each could be modeled
108
mathematically. Modern astronomy, of course, has come to model
the Sun as a point around which the Earth rotates along an elliptical
orbit. Other variations on these hypotheses are undoubtedly possible—
Duhem noted the possibility of infinite hypotheses to explain a
phenomenon, where the choice among hypotheses was a mere question
of metaphysics and not pure science. If one wishes to hew to a mostly
disfavored view of geocentrism, one has the eccentric and epicycle
theories as choices. If one wishes to adopt the philosophical stance of
Galileo, one may adopt the elliptical model. If one wishes to be more
creative, any number of other choices are available. In the space of
hypotheses, there is evidently the possibility of adequate choice for at
least some scientific theories —Duhem’s use of the word “infinite” is
telling in this respect. Further, the scientist is free to choose among the
universe of possible hypotheses using the sort of personal (or
metaphysical) judgment that characterizes a finding of creativity in
previous court decisions.
Exactly the same may be said of the specific models and equations
that make up a scientific theory. Newton was free to propose an
equation that based gravity on the reciprocal of the square of the
distance between two objects (among other things), and that did not
preclude Einstein from developing a theory of relativity that very
differently models gravity via his field equations. Any number of
mathematical representations for a given theory are possible, not just
as between different theories in the Newtonian and Einsteinian cases,
of the mouth involved, or by the anesthesia employed, or in any of a dozen different
ways.
Id. at 979. See also, Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, where the Court concluded
that certain copier codes were not copyrightable. 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004). In this respect, it
faulted the district court’s previous finding of alternatives in the codes by noting that the possible
use of other constants in the codes “do not appear to represent alternative means of expressing the
ideas or methods of operations embodied in the Toner Loading Program; they appear to be
different ideas or methods of operation altogether.” Id. at 540.
108. DUHEM, TO SAVE THE PHENOMENA, supra note 72, at 16.
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but within a single theoretical framework. Mathematics is generally a
pliable enough field that many different equations can be relied upon
to achieve effectively the same set of results. Although they were
ultimately rejected, eccentrics and epicycles did a reasonable job of
predicting the movement of various celestial bodies, and those two
could be used in some respects as a near one-to-one replacement for a
set of calculations based on the elliptical orbits of the planets of the
Solar System. This sort of mathematical openness and
interchangeability, which pervades any number of domains beyond
simple mechanics, speaks to the possible presence of sufficient
alternatives for a finding of copyrightable creativity in the selection of
one particular set of mathematical equations or models for a given
theory. Further, as the scientist selecting such mathematical symbolism
for a theory will often have exercised more than a “garden-variety”
109
amount of judgment, the second prong of the creativity test regularly
applied by courts will equally be satisfied. Mathematical models in
support of scientific theory should, in principle, be susceptible of the
sort of creativity that merits copyright protection.
Even where scientific theory most approaches reality—via the
classification naturelle—it still is capable of evidencing creativity.
Again, despite the purported perfection and elegance of a theory that
achieves the rare reflection of the classification naturelle, that theory
is still only an approximation of reality—it has not passed into the
space of the real by virtue of its highly-predictive modeling. Yet might
it be too close to reality to merit copyright protection? One might argue
this point by noting that there are very few alternatives that embody the
proposed scientific theory with such clarity, economy, or accuracy. For
want of alternatives, copyright should be hesitant to grant an overbroad
monopoly on a theory that is both necessary to other researchers and
hard to replace. This argument may be answered by noting that this
leads to the somewhat perverse outcome that the scientists generating
the most elegant theories would fail to receive copyright protection
while lesser scientific theories are rewarded for their inaccuracies and
lack of economy. The argument is doubly persuasive in view of
Duhem’s belief that theories that reflect the classification naturelle are
109. See Burk, supra note 17, at 334 (“The scientist chooses carefully and deliberately what
aspects of his research deserve to be reported. In doing so, he exercises the creativity that lies at
the heart of science. The universe is far too complex to be completely and accurately described
by humans; science presents not a comprehensive description of nature, but rather a simplified
model that the human mind can grasp. The essence of scientific genius is the ability to choose
what ought to be included in the model, and what ought to be left out.”). It should be noted that
this citation supports not only the premise that scientists exercise a form of creative authorial
choice, but also that their models and theories are not realist, but rationalist, in nature.
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sources of the highest form of aesthetic beauty in science. Aesthetic
beauty and artistry are precisely what copyright has always sought to
protect—there is no reason the most aesthetically-pleasing books and
paintings should be eligible for copyright protection while the
embodiment of the most beautiful scientific theories is not (and
certainly not if we are willing to accord copyrightability to other
theories).
Affording copyrightability to scientific theory would not
necessarily run afoul of copyright’s bedrock principle—the utilitarian
theory of copyright. The utilitarian theory operates on a premise of
exchange—by granting artists, musicians, authors, and other creators
certain economic incentives in their work, those creators will be more
110
likely to create and circulate their work. This exchange requires a
certain balance to be struck in the incentives and goods to be
exchanged, lest one side unduly profit at the other’s expense. If, for
example, a copyright protected no more than the exact words in a book
or the exact notes in an entire song, then would-be infringers could get
off with strictly de minimis changes to an original work, and the
economic incentives to create would suffer. If, on the other hand, a
copyright protected a work so thoroughly as to cover the very general
idea of the work, fundamental ideas necessary for future works would
be monopolized by the first person to embody them in any work at all,
and society would suffer for lack of both non-infringing protected
works and an ample public domain. Fortunately, copyright law mostly
avoids these obvious pitfalls (and others less obvious) by maintaining
a dichotomy, mentioned above, between unprotectable “infrastructure”
and protectable “application.” Professor Peter Lee defines
unprotectable infrastructure according to three criteria:
(1) the resource is at least partially nonrival;
(2) it derives its primary social value from facilitating
downstream productive activity; and
(3) it serves as an input into a wide range of goods and
services, including private, public, and nonmarket goods.
Extended to intellectual property, intangible resources
satisfying
these
criteria
qualify
as
intellectual
111
infrastructure.

110. See Lee, supra note 25, at 52-53 (“Although the ‘immediate effect’ of copyright law
‘is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor,’ the ‘ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.’” (emphasis added)) (citing Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
111. Id. at 55.
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By way of clarification, the first factor turns on the resource not being
112
diminished by additional use; the second views the resource as more
of a means of communication than an end in itself; and the third, of
113
course, speaks to the need for subsequent reuse of the resource. It
makes perfect sense that words or general ideas would be considered
infrastructure according to this definition, as each serves as a means to
support endlessly growing downstream production.
114
Although natural laws end up lumped in with words and ideas,
it is less clear why such laws, at least embodied in the form of scientific
theory, should necessarily qualify as infrastructure. While scientific
theory may lead to a variety of downstream creation—both educational
and applied, that does not mean that scientific theory does not serve as
an end in and of itself. Scientific theory is a human construction to
improve understanding of natural phenomena and perhaps even to bend
reality to the theoretical construction, if Gaston Bachelard’s view of
115
relativity is to be believed. Such a construction can both be created
and stand on its own, without any further application. That is science
in its purest form—that someone might come along to profit from it by
applying it downstream seems all the more reason to protect scientific
theory against such exploitation. In some respects, the infrastructure
construction may be an ill fit in this particular case.
In others, though, infrastructure’s division may be a good fit in
support of the protection of scientific theory. Copyright law’s
preservation of necessary infrastructure relies on two key limits in
copyright’s scope—fair use and merger—that makes it a good
candidate to protect scientific theory without overprotecting scientific
theory.
Fair use, defined generally if wordily, is an exception to
infringement where a party that has no rights to a copyrighted work
may under certain circumstances exercise protected rights in that work
without a license from the work’s owner.116 The exception is based on
the understanding the intellectual progress often means that current
work must be based in part on prior work and must be able to access,
retransmit, and transform such work. Parodists need to be able to use
117
the original work that they parody to a certain extent.
Academic
commentators need to be able to quote the original works on which
112. Id.
113. Id. at 56.
114. Id. at 54.
115. See generally GASTON BACHELARD, LA VALEUR INDUCTIVE DE LA RELATIVITÉ (J.
Vrin 2014).
116. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
117. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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they comment. Teachers need to be able to instruct their students in
reliance on original works, not paraphrases contrived to attempt to
avoid infringement. Fair use exists to allow such practices and others
like it.
118
The doctrine, which draws its origin in the common law, but
119
has since been codified in statutory form, defines the circumstances
where a use will be deemed “fair” based on a four-factor balancing test.
The four factors to be considered are: (1) the purpose and character of
the use, including whether it transforms the original, or is for
educational, academic, or non-commercial purposes, (2) the nature of
the original copyrighted work—that is, whether it is more or less
creative, (3) the amount of the original work used, both qualitatively
and quantitatively, and (4) the effect that the use will have on the
120
market for the original work. Either the great attribute or the great
fault of fair use—depending on one’s view—is that it allows for no
bright-line rules; but the statutory factors and case law do provide
certain high-level data points. Uses are likely to be found fair if they
121
tend to: (1) be more transformative of the original, (2) borrow from
122
a more functional or dry source, (3) use less than all of the original
123
work, including avoiding using the heart of the work, and (4) have
124
little or no impact on the market of the original. As the test is based
on a weighing of factors, however, a use does not need to “win” on all
four factors to be found fair.
Even in view of this high-level background, it is easy to imagine
how fair use would accommodate the use of a protected set of scientific
models, equations, or hypotheses in certain key cases. The most typical
examples would involve the use of the theory in an academic or
scholarly setting—as fodder for a conference talk, a journal article, or
a textbook. In each of these cases, the argument for fair use will often
118. The case offered as a historical origin for the doctrine is Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.
342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
119. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
120. See id.
121. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding use of a
photograph transformative when used as generic raw material for a larger artistic work); Seltzer
v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding the use of a modified piece of artwork
during Green Day’s concerts sufficiently transformative).
122. Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters. Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287,
1312 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Works that are ‘closer to the core of intended copyright protection,’ and
thus merit greater protection, include original as opposed to derivative works; creative as opposed
to factual works; and unpublished as opposed to published works.”).
123. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 587 (1994) (This factor “calls for
thought not only about the quantity of the materials used, but about their quality and importance,
too.”).
124. Id. at 590.

28

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 34

be compelling. Most critically, under the first factor, the use would be
non-commercial in many cases, as the conference talk or article may
not involve direct compensation. The uses would be academic, a type
of use explicitly mentioned in the statute as favoring a finding of fair
use. Finally, the uses would be very likely to be transformative, for
even if the entire equation or model was reproduced, it would be within
a larger work that altered the theory’s context by critiquing it,
classifying, or explaining it along with other scientific theories. In other
words, later scientific users would be likely to be producing new and
valuable material based on the original equation rather than simply
125
exploiting it as a source of misappropriated gain.
Meanwhile,
commercial users relying on an entire theory for commercial gain
would be less likely to be deemed non-infringing due to fair use. Those
users would by definition be commercial in nature; they would be
taking the entirety of a work; and they would be operating in a
derivative market that the theorist might have leveraged for
commercial gain. If fair use were to work this way for scientific
theory—by excusing the academic user while demanding license fees
of the commercial user—it would seem to be serving its core aim, the
promotion of a wholly equitable result.
The merger doctrine would serve a similar end by eliminating
copyright protection entirely for certain scientific theories. As the word
“merger” suggests, merger doctrine applies when a work’s idea and its
expression are deemed to merge—in other words, when an idea admits
of so few different alternative forms of expression that the idea and the
expression are effectively one and the same. In such cases, a work is
not eligible for copyright protection. Examples of merger have
126
occurred in cases involving a map of a pipeline route, a set of box127
top instructions, and a building code subsequently adopted as law in
128
a Texas town. These cases share a very limited space in which the
idea may operate. Once a pipeline route has been selected, its map
follows as a matter of course. Box-top instructions to make a purchaser
aware of a contest or a rebate tend to be fairly sparse and strictly
informational. A building code, once adopted into law, has transformed
into an inflexible, uncopyrighted artifact. One can imagine a scientific
theory that would offer a similar lack of openness, due to the simplicity
125. Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1259 (2d Cir. 1986) (“From the earliest
days of the [fair use] doctrine, courts have recognized that when a second author uses another’s
protected expression in a creative and inventive way, the result may be the advancement of
learning rather than the exploitation of the first writer.”).
126. Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458 (5th Cir. 1990).
127. Morrisey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
128. Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002).
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of both the theory’s idea and the phenomenon modeled, and the lack of
alternative means of constructing an equivalent theory. Where
Duhem’s proposed openness finds a real-life counterexample,
copyright will not honor that theory with its protection—perhaps all the
more reason to trust Duhem’s theory in the first place. Either way,
between fair use and the merger doctrine, copyright offers two key
means for protecting a robust public domain, even if scientific theory
were to become copyrightable.
We might close this argument with an evocation of an image
offered by the French academician Michel Serres. His book Le Parasite
is—consistent with most of his work—a meditation on information
theory and on information’s susceptibility to error in transit, its decay
129
in time, amid the overarching chaos of pure noise. Information is not
just the message traveling on an electrical wire or other network,
however; information is any arrangement that breaks from the chaotic
equilibrium, be it a machine, a living organism, or an unusual
concentration of gas particles. It is the Lucretian clinamen rippling
turbulently amid a field of unidirectional, laminar flow. In all things,
both order and chaos, information and noise are capable of co-existing
and interacting in an ever-evolving cycle. So, when Serres speaks of
treating a certain arrangement of atoms (like a human body) as a
“system,” he highlights the side of the system often neglected. Where
most see the system as a site of overarching order, Serres is quick to
recall that this externally-constructed (and externally-projecting)
information retains an internal double of noise and chaos that continue
to exist within the system despite its apparent containment. For
example, in the system tracking the interaction between oxygen and the
human body, one is quick to recall that oxygen is a beneficial source of
heat yet quick to forget that oxygen is also a part of the oxidation
130
process that is aging. The system is a black box that simultaneously
reveals a certain amount of information about the relations selected all
while interposing an opaque barrier between the observer and the
131
chaotic or deviant behavior that remains within the system.
In its latter ignorance, the system is not knowledge, but “non132
knowledge.”
Serres views knowledge as a bridge between pure
133
chaos and system. If this be the case, then knowledge is a form of
transit, of transformation, that can only meaningfully generate
129. See generally MICHEL SERRES, LE PARASITE (Pluriel 2014) (1980) translated in
MICHEL SERRES, THE PARASITE (Lawrence R. Schehr, trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1982).
130. Id. at 72.
131. Id. at 73.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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understanding through the creation of systems. Science and scientific
theory clearly merit this treatment. What this suggests is still another
dimension of indeterminacy in the creation of scientific theory.
Where to this point in the Article Duhem’s philosophy has
highlighted the fundamental openness in translation between observed
phenomenon and the resulting scientific model or theory, Serres would
add that indeterminacy also exists within the model or theory finally
proposed. By selecting a certain set of conditions and mathematical
symbols, certain behaviors in a system may be modeled well, but there
ever remains a fringe within the system which does not align with a
model’s predictions, that remains unpredictable and unknown. This
additional space of indeterminacy, of Brownian motion, of chaos
serves as a reminder that scientific theory is never complete and never
completed. It is instead an ever-open and ever-evolving set of
constructs that require as much creativity fed into the choice of a
system and its parameters as it requires pure factual observation and
tabulation. Irreducible movement and creativity is the hallmark of what
copyright law protects. Accordingly, copyright law should be open to
protecting scientific theories.
II. AN ARGUMENT NOT TO PROTECT SCIENTIFIC THEORY UNDER
COPYRIGHT LAW
The distinction between rationalism and realism is an equally
good starting point for an argument against the copyrightability of
scientific theories. To justify potential protection for scientific theory,
recourse to a rationalist point of view is necessary, as realism could not
possibly accommodate protection. If the equations and models of
scientific theory are in fact reality, then granting copyright in such
works would be tantamount to granting legal control over reality. That
would quite obviously run afoul of the section 102(b) prohibitions on
copyright protection—that copyright does not protect any “idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
134
discovery.” Scientific theory as reality would be relegated to simple
principle tethered to natural phenomena, mere discovery of pre135
existing reality, stripped of any Latourian inversion.
Beyond the language of section 102(b), the policy motivating it—
the utilitarian theory of copyright protection—would suffice to show
that a realist construction of scientific theory would not provide the
basis for any copyright protection in scientific theories. It may be

134.
135.

17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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recalled that the utilitarian theory aims to strike a balance in protection
such that creators retain sufficient economic incentives to create
without giving such creators too much protection in the interest of
preserving a rich public domain for subsequent creators. Granting
copyright in reality is a form of clear overprotection, where copyright’s
comfort zone shielding specific words on a page or bits on a drive
morphs into an uncomfortable protection of the very phenomena that
happen in the perceived universe. We would effectively be back in the
reductio ad absurdum case where intellectual property in Newton’s
gravitational equations would allow a modern Newton to exact
royalties for activities like sitting in a chair or jumping up and down.
That would represent an unacceptable level of economic control for a
creator at the expense of the public domain.
Yet arguments against the copyrightability of scientific theories
do not require espousing a realist perspective—the protection of
theories need not be any more palatable under a rationalist view.
Because the rationalist argument in favor of copyright protection for
scientific theory is already well-established, the rationalist argument
against protection of scientific theory will require a bit more
development. First, it will be necessary to flesh out certain important
details of Duhem’s philosophy of science that were critically left
underarticulated in the first part. For all of the seeming equivalence that
Duhem viewed as built into scientific theory in both hypotheses and
mathematical models, he was also aware of—if occasionally somewhat
refractory to—science’s tendency to advance better and better models.
Thereafter, it will be necessary to move beyond Duhem’s thought by
demonstrating certain ways in which his philosophy of science is
arguably inadequate to capture the movement of science, even as a
rationalist endeavor. This will require a certain degree of reliance on
136
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Lest this move seem
to violate an unspoken rule of argument here, it should be noted that
critics have seen Duhem’s work as thoroughly anticipating Kuhn’s by
137
fifty or so years.
To present Duhem’s philosophy as it was in the first part of this
Article is to depict the great edifice of scientific theory as a completely
relative, interchangeable, and open construction. Any scientific theory
is potentially open to being expressed—either as a hypothesis or as a
mathematical model—in the form of infinite unexpressed alternatives.
If each potential theory were a node in a great network, scientists could
136.
137.

KUHN, supra note 42.
Paul Brouzeng’s introduction to Duhem’s La Théorie Physique claims as much. See
DUHEM, LA THÉORIE PHYSIQUE, supra note 43.
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pass from one equivalent node to the next without loss in predictive
precision. Any scientist unhappy with the node that current science
favored could simply shift to an adjacent equivalent and continue to
produce good results. To add a temporal dimension to this, science
would also be able to jump without substantial loss of precision
between theories propounded at very different times. Take, for
example, the difference between Ptolemaic epicycles, post-Galilean
ellipses, and the more complicated motion of Einsteinian relativity
when modeling the movement of the planets around the Sun. In its most
open form, Duhem’s theory would seem to view these, and an infinite
number of mathematical alternatives, as effectively equivalent ways of
138
modeling the same thing.
Science is in this respect wholly
reversible, able to pass seamlessly between different theories, both
forwards and backwards in time. Science couched in these terms is
Newtonian, for Newton’s equations yield the same results without
regard to the direction of the time vector. Anything that has been done
139
under Newton’s laws can be undone and redone infinitely.
To
support copyright in scientific theory, one must favor this open
temporality which, in turn, leads to infinite generativity in the realm of
possible scientific theories. And if infinite equivalent models are
possible, then no scientific creator risks accruing a problematic
monopoly over intellectual property infrastructure. On the contrary, all
scientific theory could safely be viewed as a form of protectable
intellectual property application.
This is not even how scientific theory works within Duhem’s
philosophy, however. The freedom to express alternatives in any
number of ways is automatically trimmed according to two critical
criteria—economy of thought and the temporally-bound, accretive
movement of science via the classification naturelle. Economy of
thought as key in the creation and perpetuation of scientific theories—
140
an idea often associated with the scientists Ernst Mach and Henri
Poincaré—speaks to a successful theory’s lapidary way of distilling
141
incredible complexity to a manageable and memorable snapshot.
One can easily be overwhelmed imagining the disparate number, type,
138. DUHEM, supra note 41, at 188-89.
139. This is Ilya Prigogine’s complaint about Newtonian physics and any scientific theory
that relies on such a construction of time. See generally ILYA PRIGOGINE & ISABELLE STENGERS,
LA NOUVELLE ALLIANCE (Folio, 2d ed. 1986) (1978); see also ILYA PRIGOGINE, LA FIN DES
CERTITUDES (Editions Odile Jacob 1996).
140. Duhem offered a very favorable review of the first French translation of one of Mach’s
works. He also noted Mach’s claim to have been the first to highlight economy of thought as a
driving factor in the creation of scientific theory. DUHEM, supra note 41, at 444.
141. DUHEM, LA THÉORIE PHYSIQUE, supra note 43, at 46-48.
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size, and shape of mechanical bodies governed at least generally by
Newton’s gravitational and force equations. Newton’s equations allow
much of this variety to be treated as mere noise, while focusing on
critical variables like the mass of the objects in question and their
distance apart. With these critical data points in tow, meaningful
calculations are possible via a few easily-recalled equations. If a variety
of other mathematical equations might approximately achieve the same
numerical results as Newton’s equations, basically every such equation
would be more difficult to remember and use than its Newtonian
analogues. The same could be said of other similarly economical
formulae, like Snell’s Law to measure the refraction of light, Einstein’s
relation between mass, energy and the speed of light (E = mc2), and the
ideal gas law.
The classification naturelle exerts a dual limitation on the
possible existence of alternative means of expressing a scientific
theory. One such limitation is temporally based; the other is linked to
predictive precision. The two limitations generally evolve in tandem,
however, where change in theory over time is closely linked to
142
improvement in theory’s predictive results. Because of the improved
precision of theories that merit the designation of a classification
naturelle, science is ever undergoing an accretive, unidirectional
process of improvement where theories provide closer and closer
143
predictions of the behavior of natural phenomena.
Duhem provides an analogy for precisely the tension at issue
144
here—the observer of the ocean’s waves from the shore.
Such an
observer will very clearly see the seemingly haphazard struggle of one
wave crashing into another, or a set of waves pulling back into the
ocean as another pushes its crest shoreward. Yet beneath the stochastic
noise and seeming lack of progress of these movements, there is a
guided movement, that of the tide coming in or going out. The
proponent of copyright protection in scientific theory would ask to see
142. A notable exception to this tandem growth is string theory in astrophysics. Unlike
Newtonian mechanics and Einsteinian relativity before it, string theory has not made particularly
meaningful predictions to explain anomalous observations not yet understood. This is in part due
to the lack of a single monolithic string theory (there are infinite possible string theories, so
perhaps copyright law would not be ill-applied here), and in part because of the lack of testability
of much of what any such string theory posits. All of this has led one notable physicist to refer to
string theory as a fallow field granted institutional importance only through a sort of groupthink.
See generally LEE SMOLIN, THE TROUBLE WITH PHYSICS (Mariner Books 2007) (2006).
143. There is a reason that one of Duhem’s books contains the word evolution in its title. In
that case, Duhem speaks of the evolution of mechanics. Mechanics in Duhem’s time, he proclaims
in the final paragraph of his book, was a corollary to mechanics reaching back to ancient Greece
and would undoubtedly serve as a corollary for future development in the field. DUHEM, supra
note 41, at 188-89.
144. DUHEM, LA THÉORIE PHYSIQUE, supra note 43, at 38-39.
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only the frothy turbulence of scientific movements crashing into each
other chaotically, without guided movement. All waves are more or
less equal, that proponent suggests, and can be swapped in and out of
human conception with little or no loss. That proponent misses the
ocean’s movement for the waves (and the forest for the trees, of
course), as science pursues a process that is often as much irreversible
as it is reversible.
To take the three examples provided above, one cannot seamlessly
slip between Ptolemaic, Galilean, and Einsteinian theoretical systems.
Ptolemy’s epicycles may have developed mathematically accurate
predictions as to the locations of planets and stars, but it relies on a
geocentric construction belied by later models. Galilean ellipses may
remedy the geocentric flaw, but even they do not adequately predict the
progression of Mercury’s perihelion—only Einstein’s theory does
145
that. As scientific theory gets more and more accurate in time, new
phenomena fall within its purview, all while long-studied phenomena
become better and better understood. Scientific theorists cannot simply
move from theory at one point in time to another and expect equally
146
good results.
This series of constraints on the interchangeability of scientific
theory within the philosophy of Duhem has an analogue in current
copyright jurisprudence—the treatment of computer software as
copyrightable. The analogue is not completely surprising—just as one
court has noted that software combines elements of creative and
147
technical expression in one work,
so too does scientific theory
capture the creativity and inventiveness of the scientist alongside the
technical requirements of empirical and mathematical precision.

145. See EINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 117-18.
146. See Burk, supra note 17, at 308 (“Much of the social mechanism of science is devoted
to regulating the acquisition, dissemination, and interpretation of empirical data. Empirical truth
forms the foundation of the scientific edifice, and each participant in the scientific enterprise
builds upon the work done by previous participants. In order to participate, the scientist must be
aware of previous work and in turn, make his work known to others. Consequently, in order to
advance the state of science, and to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, the system must
encourage scientists to share their results with one another. As a result, the scientific community
consists of a cooperative structure within which empirical data may be freely shared.” (footnotes
omitted)). See also Goldberg, supra note 14, at 1342 (“[S]cience appears unambiguously to make
progress. It may be a truism to say that scientists today know more than scientists in the past, but
it is a truism with important implications. An assistant professor of biology today may know more
about evolution than Darwin. That does not mean the professor is brighter than Darwin, but only
that she stands on Darwin's shoulders and on the shoulders of many other scientists. Because
science is in this sense cumulative, it is possible to say that a particular scientist has made an
important contribution.”).
147. Comput. Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 704 (2d Cir. 1992).
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In the space of software copyright cases involving a claim of
infringement, courts often rely on the three-step abstraction-filtrationcomparison test originally proposed by the Second Circuit in Computer
148
Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. The first two steps of the
test involve the identification of aspects of an original piece of software
code that is not copyrightable due to a variety of factors, and the
subsequent removal of such unprotectable aspects from the ultimate
infringement comparison. Items that the Second Circuit deemed
appropriate for such filtration included software elements dictated by
149
efficiency considerations,
software elements dictated by external
factors (like programming language- or interoperability-related
150
151
constraints),
and elements already in the public domain.
In the
realm of scientific theory under Duhem’s philosophy, similar
abstraction and filtration steps would yield the removal of elements of
a theory dictated by: (1) a desire to achieve an economy of thought in
formulation, (2) a better capacity to model and predict actual
phenomena compared to previous scientific models and theories, (3)
high-level, unprotectable ideas (i.e., that “objects are attracted to one
another”), and (4) elements of the theory dictated by the advance of
science, including elements of prior science that have fallen into (or
have always been in) the public domain. In view of these constraints,
what once looked like a field ripe for copyright protection in Part II
now would seem to offer almost no possibility for copyright protection
at all.
The creator of a traditional aesthetic work and the modern-day
scientist face very different decision trees when undertaking their
work, and thus the creator and scientist should face very different legal
protection systems in the result of that work. For an author, sculptor,
painter, or other aesthetically-motivated creator, there remains
tremendous freedom to generate work based on any source of
inspiration. An author can jump back in time to Homer for poetic
structure, take a cue from Nabokov or Dickens when writing a novel,
or write a play based on the ideas of Ibsen, Shakespeare, or Tennessee
Williams. Artists can similarly draw guidance from a Turner, Monet,
or Seurat in visual art. Or perhaps the author or artist wants to follow a
new direction and found a school that would be the new Dadaism or
Cubism or any other -ism. Even the Roman Expérimental project

148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 706.
Id. at 707-09.
Id. at 709-10.
Id. at 710.

36

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 34

152

proposed by Zola, where a novel’s events were allegedly the result
of a scientifically-determined sequence of events, is not to be taken
particularly seriously. The idea of that project was much more an
answer to Zola’s critics (who did not like what they perceived as vulgar
content in his books) than it was an actual description of how any novel
comes together. There remains a substantial margin of freedom in the
creation of any aesthetically-motivated work, where time and space can
bend, and the rules of a school of thought or a view of the universe can
be bent, broken, repurposed, or reinvented.
In comparison with the artist or author, much less is possible for
the typical scientist, who must work within an established framework
that applies constraints in a variety of dimensions. One is what Gaston
153
Bachelard calls the phénomènotechnique,
the set of technological
preconditions assumed by a science at a given time. The theory
governing many modern phenomena does not only depend on modern
tools like a mass spectrometer; it is entirely constituted by such
154
tools. With each complicated tool which modern science requires, a
host of assumptions must be made about the reliability of such tools
and the theories that went into their construction. Scientists also are
generally required to remain up-to-date in the current state of their field
155
(to avoid duplicative results, to promote new work, etc.). By doing
that, however, scientists are buying into a great theoretical construct
that may draw on numerous mathematical and scientific disciplines,
and centuries of slow development, much of which is taken as assumed.
An astronomer may have a lot of freedoms, but among them are not the
ability to re-invent calculus or re-adopt Ptolemy. The overarching
takeaway may be a bit over-generalized and over-simplified, but it is
safe to say that traditional aesthetic artists are free to work in their own
specific clinamen-informed ripples while scientists must pay much
more attention to their domain’s overarching tide.
Before re-emphasizing this point in a final argument that owes
much to Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, a few points
of copyright policy bear mention here in their lack of support for the
protectability of scientific theory. While it is true that copyright
152. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
153. See generally BACHELARD, supra note 53 (discussing the concept of
phénomènotechnique); see also LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 54, at 63-64, 238 (revisiting
the concept).
154. LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 54, at 59.
155. See sources cited supra note 140 and accompanying text; see also Rai, supra note 5, at
124 (“As Rebecca Eisenberg has emphasized, these accounts hold that progress in basic science
occurs most quickly not when it is coordinated by a single entity (such as a patent holder) but,
rather, when different teams of scientists, working independently but with an awareness of each
other's efforts, use divergent approaches to the same problem.”).

2017]

ON COPYRIGHT AND SCIENTIFIC THEORY

37

protects dryer content—the examples of used car prices, statistical
156
forms, and computer software have been given —these are areas
where copyright struggles mightily to find its bearings. Take, for
example, the area of parts numbers or other basic numerical sequences,
which some litigants have proposed to be worthy of copyright
157
protection.
Courts have consistently struggled in such cases to
determine a workable definition of both the idea and the expression
involved in the assignment or creation of such numbers.
Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp. is a good example of this,
where the majority found that a parts numbering system did not merit
copyright protection. The system itself was a set of short codes that
indexed different characteristics of rivets, latches, and similar pieces of
hardware, where the codes could be combined serially to describe a
158
given part. The majority dismissed the possibility that such codes
could be protected, as the creation of the initial codes reflected a mere
unprotectable “idea” or “system,” and that the subsequent application
159
of the system to specific parts was a wholly uncreative exercise. The
dissent in Southco disagreed with the majority’s characterization of the
160
specific code numbering system at issue as an uncopyrightable idea.
The dissent instead viewed the concept of code numbering systems in
general as the idea and the specific system selected by the plaintiff as
161
an expression of that idea.
The reality is, neither the majority nor the dissent is
overwhelmingly persuasive in Southco, but that is not their fault. They
are deciding a case in a space where the unprotectable “idea” has only
two possible forms—“the idea of creating a parts numbering system”
or “the idea of creating the specific parts numbering system at issue
here.” The protectable expression, meanwhile, is even harder to
discern, as the application of numbers to parts does not involve any
meaningful, articulable aesthetic choice. On one hand, a court could
find such parts numbers protectable in their very specific articulation
and not worry too much as other such systems would be available to
others (as did the dissent), or it could determine that there is no
expressive content at any level in the system (as did the majority).

156. See cases cited supra notes 33-35.
157. See, e.g., Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986); Mitel, Inc. v.
Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997); Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276 (3d
Cir. 2004).
158. See Southco, 390 F.3d at 278.
159. Id. at 282.
160. Id. at 291 (Roth, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 291-92.

38

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 34

It is easy to imagine similarly difficult questions arising in a space
where scientific theory in its purest form of equations and models is
believed to be potentially eligible for copyright. The equations and
models would be as dry and functional as any set of parts numbers, and
they would be motivated by a clear, functional idea underlying the
specific equation chosen. Courts would be left wondering what about
that specific equation or model is expressive in a way that is not
thoroughly dictated by the underlying idea and other constraints
already discussed here.
Courts would face an additional issue presented by the Southco
case and other functional works eligible for copyright—the paradoxical
incentive to provide the greatest protection for that which should be
least copyrightable due to its functionality. Likely the most valuable
element of the Southco numbering system was its ability to
communicate characteristics about a part based on a number. Yet this
communicative ability followed foremost from a dry or rote application
of pre-established codes to existing parts. In other words, the system’s
point of value is precisely its least creative, most functional feature.
The same could be said of copyright in software, where software’s real
value is its ability to do something successfully in a computer system
and not its reliance on fanciful code that does not perform well or
efficiently. One would correctly assume that it is the latter that should
be most eligible for copyright protection, while the former
functionality should remain unprotected under section 102(b). The
same logic would apply to scientific theory, where copyright would
seem most adequate to protect parts of a model or theory that do not
represent reality well, while the most accurate portions would work a
merger between the equation, on one hand, and the observed
phenomena or underlying scientific idea, on the other. The
classification naturelle may have been beautiful to Duhem, but its
beauty derives from the perfection of its functionality, its predictive
precision—the very aspect of the theory that should not merit copyright
protection.
The question of infringement by later theorists in the same
scientific space would present its own unusual challenges. What sort of
equation or theory that leads to the same results could be found
infringing? It could be just the original equation or theory, such that all
alternative articulation of the original’s terms avoids a finding of
infringement. Such would be a presumption of a very thin copyright in
a theory. Or perhaps courts might figure out a way to determine
infringing alternatives from non-infringing ones. Yet how could that
distinction be made plausibly? In the space of copyrightable works
relying on written language like articles and books, there is some ability
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to distinguish between a non-infringing second work and a second
work that merely illicitly paraphrases the original (even if that work
does not go so far as exact copying). In mathematical symbolism, it is
much less clear what paraphrasing might mean. It could mean
anything from—(1) two equations that lead to effectively the same
results, to (2) two equations that use a certain percentage of the same
functions, to (3) two equations that rely on similar mathematical
theories, to (4) two equations that are the same but for de minimis
changes. Any of these choices would seem defensible, but would lead
to very different, and potentially very hard-to-administer, legal rules.
It is not at all clear that wading into these murky waters offers all
that much benefit. As already mentioned, the community of theoretical
scientists currently enjoys its own system of rewards, privileges, and
incentives largely outside of the domain of copyright protections.
Further, commentators have often observed institutional science’s
162
aversion to the insertion of legal rigors in their practices.
There
seems little necessity to alter incentives in a system that is currently
functioning, particularly where the creation of additional incentives
would bring along a host of new legal complexities that would be very
costly to figure out and manage. Only re-enforcing this point is the
intellectual property infrastructure argument—because scientific
theory is often needed for use in a range of downstream goods and
services, it fits more appropriately in the space of unprotected
infrastructure than in that of protectable application. When a system
functions reasonably well, as here, perhaps the best approach is to let
it continue and keep the more drastic changes for a different situation.
As a final point, Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions provides a reminder that some of the relativizing views of
Duhem or Latour do not have as much currency in a domain of legal
analysis. Latour, it may be recalled, focuses his sociological studies
163
broadly, on both the vainqueurs and the vaincus, the winners and the
losers in a given scientific domain investigated. Duhem, for his part,
was unfortunate enough to be on the losing team, as his commitment
to energetics would ultimately prove misguided due to the rise of
atomic theory. When approaching the study of science from a
162. See Burk, supra note 17, at 320 (Legal procedures “do not necessarily reflect the values
and norms of science, and the intrusion of such procedures into the scientific community poses
something of a challenge to the culture of science.”); see also Goldberg, supra note 14, at 1345
(noting the tension between the lawyer’s focus on process and the scientist’s focus on progress).
163. See LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 54, at 15-17; see also BRUNO LATOUR,
PASTEUR : GUERRE ET PAIX DES MICROBES 55 (La Découverte 2011) (1984) translated in BRUNO
LATOUR, THE PASTEURIZATION OF FRANCE 111 (Alan Sheridan & John Law eds., Harvard Univ.
Press 1988).
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perspective of the vaincus, one is more inclined to see the relative
merits of competing theories and avoid completely rejecting plausible
theories due to the sole influence of social forces. Science has not,
however, developed solely due to social factors, and not all theories
that were once held in esteem should be viewed as more or less
equivalent to currently influential theories (though by no means should
rejected theories be slighted entirely in a glorification of those who
ultimately won).
The theory of relativity—ironically enough—stands as an
exemplary obstacle to an ideal that relativizes a range of scientific
theories. To understand this, awareness of the rise of non-Euclidean
geometry is of some importance, as that framework broke with
centuries of belief that Euclid’s straight line- and plane-based geometry
was the only way to do such mathematics. With non-Euclidean
geometry, another system seemed to perform just as well, even if based
on parabolas or hyperbolas instead of lines. What seems like a
justification for a more relativized view of mathematics—a world with
multiple equivalent systems of geometry—breaks down with relativity
because the general theory of relativity does not work in Euclidean
164
geometry. Not all systems are equally good for all calculations; not
all theories should be given equal weight. Relativity pushed out
Newtonian mechanics to a certain extent; and someday another theory
will come along to supplement or replace relativity.
This leaves science in a state of Kuhnian evolution. As Kuhn
noted, the institution of science operating within an established
framework (or paradigm) mostly relies on that paradigm to generate
problems of normal science—puzzles that practitioners will attempt to
165
solve to explore the bounds of the current paradigm.
Other
paradigms are generally excluded at this phase of normal, gradual
scientific development as the scientific community ossifies its practices
(if only temporarily) around the current paradigm by developing
166
specialized equipment and vocabulary to incorporate the paradigm.
During these periods, science cannot be treated as purely relative, a sea
of alternatives where each scientist may choose one without risking
copying another. Far from it – scientists must be able to use the exact
methods and theories of the current paradigm to participate in their
community.
In time, however, each paradigm runs its course. As new results
or anomalous findings contradict its teachings and expectations, the
164.
165.
166.

EINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 109.
KUHN, supra note 42, at 38.
Id. at 64-65.
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theory will cease to be able to respond adequately to the demands
placed on it, and the science of the field will pass through a period of
167
crisis.
A new paradigm will be sought to rectify the current
paradigm’s shortcomings. This is the famous Kuhnian paradigm
168
shift,
where a whole new way of seeing the world scientifically
169
effectively inverts a previously accepted set of interpretations. Even
in this phase, there remains a crisis of difference that presupposes the
prior paradigm as a baseline, before a new period can begin, in which
the incoming paradigm drives normal science. At all times, what is
accepted as a matter of current scientific theory needs to be available
for use—either in the generation of work of normal, scientific puzzlesolving or in the push to improve, and possibly overturn, the current
paradigm in favor of a new one. Protecting such science by copyright
law could impose substantial hurdles to the fundamental
accomplishment of non-applied science’s task.
CONCLUSION
Under Kuhn’s theory governing the advancement of science,
science can be said to evolve according to an almost Darwinian notion
of time, where theories play the role of species in the theory of natural
170
selection. Established theories are capable of occupying new spaces
as their proponents solve new puzzles in normal practice, much in the
way that a species favored by the environment might spread. Yet as
environmental conditions change, established theories may become
disfavored, first in limited areas where the theory’s principles lead to
anomalous or inaccurate results and later when a more general crisis
calls for a better theory entirely. According to this process, new
theories arise in competition with established theories and can
overcome such theories where they are unable to compete for lack of a
flexible response to the scientific environment. When replaced, as in
the case of ether or phlogiston, a scientific theory may even pass from
hegemony to eventual extinction, as better adapted theories continue to
propel science’s slow forward movement. Science evolving according
to Kuhn’s theory follows a movement that is directed and historically
dependent. This view stands in stark contrast to the concept of science,
proposed earlier here, as a truly relative, atemporal, Newtonian
construction in time.
167. Id. at 82.
168. See, e.g., id. at 89.
169. Id. at 112-13.
170. See CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (The Collier Press 1909), for many
of the concepts discussed in this paragraph.
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Science’s movement retains elements of each of these types of
time, of course. The measures of laminar movement pushing the tide to
shore, and the current theories to perfection or replacement are matched
by ripples and turbulence that are far more relative and free in their
movements. For the guided Darwinian movement of science, copyright
171
protection is a decidedly poor fit. Current scientists need free access
to prevailing theories to improve that theory or propose paradigmshifting alternatives, just as future scientists will need to access new
172
paradigms in their work. In this highly-contingent environment, it is
not entirely clear that copyright law would even know what to protect
within the models and equations of a theory, in terms of separating
expression from underlying idea, process, or principle. Yet science’s
turbulent movements may come with greater freedom for the scientist
in a specific moment in time, a set of equally-palatable alternatives rich
enough in variation to merit copyright protection. And one should not
forget that no matter how accurate a theory becomes, it remains
reasonably conceived of as a rationalist construction reflecting
scientific creativity, as opposed to a dry set of uncopyrightable facts.
For now, the system denying most forms of intellectual property
protection seems to work well enough. Science continues to advance
173
through its own funding channels and with its own set of non-legal
174
incentives.
Yet, if Duhem’s theories taught us nothing, it is that
science could—under some circumstances—be an appropriate target
175
for protection by copyright law.
For the moment, the hypothesis
171. Drahos, supra note 17, at 71 (“When advanced into the area of basic science, property
rights have the potential to disrupt those normative practices (centred around open
communication), which are to operate to coordinate individual activity within science in a way
that ensures that the problem solving capacity of science as a whole is improved. Once formal
property rights enter basic science, the selections that individuals have to make become more
complicated.”); Rai, supra note 5, at 119 (“To the extent that norms of invention and
communalism are eroded by pressures to secure property rights, we lose a relatively cost-free
mechanism for enriching the store of knowledge.”).
172. See Burk, supra note 17, at 310 (“The linchpin of [the scientific] reward system is the
publication of scientific papers, or research reports. Such reports detail the investigation
performed, the methods used, the results obtained, and the researcher's conclusions. By publishing
such a report, the researcher offers his work to the community and adds it to the fund of scientific
knowledge by describing his methods and by making his results accessible to other scientists who
may wish to incorporate them into their own research efforts.”).
173. Id. at 340 (referring to public funding as the “lifeblood” of science).
174. See Drahos, supra note 17, at 69 (“Basic science operates with a reward structure which
involves no formal property claims by individuals in relation to discoveries. Instead, individuals
are given recognition and honour. The scientific discoveries themselves become part of a
scientific commons which everyone is free to draw on for their own purposes. A reward system
based on recognition dictates that individuals publish, thereby serving the goal of open
communication.”).
175. See, e.g., id. (“If science is sufficiently socially demeaned or loses its status to other
disciplines, then it will no longer appear to be so intrinsically satisfying, and property rights may

2017]

ON COPYRIGHT AND SCIENTIFIC THEORY

43

proposed here should at least remain open to future consideration, even
if it would best remain rejected for the time being. Perhaps it need
merely await a future paradigm shift in the culture of science.

have to be asked to play a greater role in soliciting creativity.”).

